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This is the second in our Contours of Crisis paper series. The first article set the stage 
for the series. It began by outlining the conventional view that this is a finance-led 
crisis, that this turmoil was triggered and amplified by “financial excesses”; it then 
described the domino sequence of collapsing markets – a process that started with the 
meltdown of the U.S. housing and FIRE sectors (finance, insurance and real estate), 
expanded to the entire financial market, and eventually pulled down the so-called 
“real economy”; and, finally, it  situated the pattern and magnitude of the current 
decline in historical context.  
The current market collapse is very significant. Even after their last month’s rise, 
U.S. equity prices, measured in constant dollars, remain 50% below their 1999 peak 
– a decline comparable to the previous major bear markets of 1905-1920, 1928-1948 
and 1968-1981. For many observers, though, the depth of the financial crash also 
implies that much of it may be over, and that the boom bulls will soon oust the doom 
bears.  
Predicting boom out of doom isn’t far fetched. Equity markets are highly cycli-
cal, and their gyrations are remarkably stylized. As our first article showed, over the 
past century the United States has experienced several major bear markets with very 
similar patterns: they all had more or less the same duration, they all shared a similar 
magnitude, and they all ended in a major bull run. In other words, there seems to be 
a certain automaticity here, and automaticity gives pundits the confidence to ex-
trapolate the future from the past.  
But this automaticity is more apparent than real. Finance, we pointed out, is not 
an independent mechanism that goes up and down on its own. In this sense, the 
long-term movements of the equity market are not “technical” swings, but rather 
reflections and manifestations of deep social transformations that alter the entire 
structure of power. During the past century, every transition from a major bear mar-
ket to a bull run was accompanied by a systemic reordering of the political economy: the 
1920–1928 upswing marked the transition from robber-baron capitalism to big busi-
ness and synchronized finance; the 1948–1968 uptrend came with the move from 
“laissez faire” capitalism to big government and the welfare-warfare state; and the 
1981–1999 boom coincided with a return to liberal regulation on the one hand and 
the explosive growth of capital flows and transnational ownership on the other. 
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The Questions 
 
So what should we expect in the wake of the current crisis? What type of transforma-
tion can pull capitalism out of its current rout? How will this transformation be 
brought about, by whom and against what opposition? Can this transformation be 
achieved – and what might the consequences be if it fails?  
Unfortunately, these questions cannot readily be answered for two basic reasons. 
The first reason concerns our very inability to transcend the present. Contrary to 
what the prophets of economics and the fortunetellers of finance like to believe 
(though consistently fail to demonstrate), the future of society is largely unknowable.  
It is of course true that, in retrospect, many historical developments appear obvi-
ous, if not inevitable. Looking back, the transition of the 1920s to big business and 
synchronized finance, the emergence during the 1940s and 1950s of large govern-
ments and the welfare-warfare state, and the imposition since the 1980s of neoliberal 
regulation and freely flowing finance all seem to make perfect sense. These transfor-
mations succeeded in resolving the crises that preceded them, and that success makes 
them look predestined. But note that before they happened, these transformations 
were almost unthinkable. Few if any of the experts saw them coming, and their pre-
cise nature remained opaque until the ensuing social restructuring was more or less 
complete.  
The key difficulty of anticipating such transformations is novelty. Fundamental 
social change creates something new, and what is truly new can never be predicted. 
According to Hegel and Marx, no individual – not even the best paid market wizard 
– can transcend her own epoch. The consciousness of social individuals – and cer-
tainly of those convinced that they are “independent” and “rational” – is largely a 
collective creature, molded by the political-economic order to which they are subju-
gated. This subjugation makes it difficult for anybody – including critics of capitalism 
– to jump over Rhodes and anticipate a different future. And, indeed, it is only in 
hindsight and after much rationalization that the ideologues start to characterize new 
developments as “unavoidable” and that the econometricians begin to build models 
that “could have” predicted them. It is only after the fact that the foretellers have 
known it all along.  
And then there is the second reason. In order to contemplate the future, even in 
the absence of novelty, one needs a firm grasp of reality. Yet it is precisely during a 
deep crisis such as today’s that this firm grasp suddenly disappears. “The whole intel-
lectual edifice . . . collapsed in the summer of last year,” explains Alan Greenspan to 
his Congressional inquisitors.1 “Our world is broken – and I honestly don’t know 
what is going to replace it,” grieves Bernie Sucher of Merrill Lynch. “[T]he pillars of 
faith on which this new financial capitalism were built have all but collapsed,” ob-
serves Gillian Tett of the Financial Times, and that collapse, she concludes, “has left 
                                                 
1 Edmund L. Andrews, “Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation,” New York Times, October 
23, 2008, p. 1. 
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everyone from finance minister or central banker to small investor or pension holder 
bereft of an intellectual compass, dazed and confused.”2 
What brought this sudden conceptual disintegration? Why has “our world” – 
i.e., the world according to the financiers – broken down? What caused the “intellec-
tual edifice” to collapse and the “pillars of faith” to crumble? How could so solid an 
ideology become so useless, so quickly?    
 
The Justifications 
 
Financial crisis, tells us György Lukács, threatens the foundations of the capitalist 
regime. The ruling class loses its self-confidence and begins to substitute ad-hoc ex-
cuses for natural-state-of-things theories. And as the ideological glue that holds the 
regime together weakens, class conflict becomes visible through the cracks of univer-
sal rhetoric, while naked force suddenly looms large behind the front window of tol-
erance. 
The present crisis fits this pattern, and so do the justifications. Some, like Alan 
Greenspan, blame it all on human nature. According to Greenspan, the banks did 
something totally unexpected: they suddenly decided to disobey the sacred rules of 
rational self-interest. Instead of following the eternal decrees of mainstream econom-
ics, they started to accumulate excessive risk that threatened their solvency. And 
since this blunt violation of the holy economic scriptures was never supposed to hap-
pen, it’s only understandable that even God’s representative at the Fed couldn’t pre-
dict the consequences.3  
Others, like Oxford economist John Kay, see the fault not at the level of the in-
dividual, but of the system as a whole. When the Queen of England wondered why 
the “the credit crisis and its evolution were not predicted” by the experts, the loyal 
subject quickly jumped to his colleagues’ defense. National economies, financial 
markets and businesses, Kay explained, are simply too complex, dynamic and non-
linear, and these systemic intricacies turn prediction into a “wild goose chase.”4  
And then there are those, like financial commentator Gideon Rachman, for 
whom the problem is largely temporary. The economists, Rachman suggests, have 
                                                 
2 Gillian Tett, “Lost Through Destructive Creation,” FT Series: Future of Capitalism, 
Financial Times, March 10, 2009, p. 9. 
3 “All the sophisticated mathematics and computer wizardry,” observes the high priest, 
“essentially rested on one central premise: that the enlightened self-interest of owners and 
managers of financial institutions would lead them to maintain a sufficient buffer against 
insolvency by actively monitoring their firm’s capital and risk position” (Alan Greenspan, 
“We Need a Better Cushion Against Risk,” Financial Times, March 23, 2009, pp. 9). “[T]hose 
of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholder’s equity 
(myself especially) are in a state of shocked disbelief. Such counterparty surveillance is a 
central pillar of our financial markets’ state of balance. If it fails, as occurred this year, market 
stability is undermined” (U.S. Congress, Testimony of Dr. Alan Greenspan, the Committee of 
Government Oversight and Reform, October 23, 2008).  
4 John Kay, “Kudos for the Contrarian,” Financial Times, December 30, 2008, p. 9. 
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actually made great strides in understanding how the economy works. But from time 
to time the economy gets infected by a “new type of economic virus,” and we need 
to be a bit patient until the economists discover the cure.5 
Unfortunately, these justifications all miss the point. The key question to ask is 
not what the economists disagree on, but what they all agree on. And what the vast 
majority of them consider as true is the mismatch thesis: i.e., the conviction that the 
basic cause of the current crisis is a discrepancy between nominal finance and the so-
called “real” economy.  
This mismatch thesis is highly detrimental. Since most economists accept it, few 
ask new questions, and even fewer give new answers. The purpose of our present 
paper is to break the deadlock by debunking this thesis.6 
 
The Mismatch Thesis 
 
The essentials of the mismatch thesis are simple enough. The thesis argues that, over 
the past decade, the nominal world of finance has deviated from and distorted the 
“real” world of accumulation. Finance, say the thesis’ adherents, has inflated into a 
bubble; the bubble has grown to become much bigger than the underlying “real” 
capital it was supposed to represent; and since there is no such thing as a free lunch, 
the current crash is the inevitable price we all have to pay for failing to prevent this 
discrepancy.  
The confessions now come out loud and clear. “It must be said plainly,” declares 
Sir Martin Sorrell, CEO of WPP, “that capitalism messed up – or, to be more pre-
cise, capitalists did. We – business, governments, consumers – submitted to excess; 
we got too greedy.”7 In other words, the culprit is the royal “We.” In the brave new 
world of neoliberalism, all of us are capitalists, at least in aspiration. And since this 
convenient collectivism makes each and every one of us responsible for the mess, it is 
only natural, at least according to the editors of the Financial Times, that “Everyone is 
paying the price.”8 
And not that anyone could have done anything to avert this sorry outcome. The 
mismatch between finance and “reality,” many now concede, is neither a fluke event 
nor something that the market itself can fix. It is a natural defect, an unfortunate im-
perfection built into the very DNA of capitalism. Finance can never be fully tamed, 
assumes John Kay, and “since financial stability is unattainable,” he concludes, “the 
more important objective is to insulate the real economy form the consequences of 
                                                 
5 Gideon Rachman, “Generation L and its Fearful Future,” Financial Times, January 13, 2009, 
p. 11. 
6 Some of our arguments here draw on Chapter 10 of our book Capital as Power. A Study of 
Order and Creorder (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), as well as on our earlier 
monograph, “The Gods Failed, The Priests Lied” (Montreal and Jerusalem, Hebrew, May 
2007). 
7 Martin Sorrell, “The Pendulum Will Swing Back,” Financial Times, April 9, 2009, p. 9. 
8 Editors, “The Return of the ‘Real’ Economy,” Financial Times, December 31, 2008, p. 6. 
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financial instability.” The best we can do, tells us Nobel Laureate Robert Solow, is 
somehow “regulate” the financiers. And how should this regulation be achieved? 
Simple: by putting a “boundary” between the bankers’ world and our own, so that 
their “bubbles of excessive speculation and financial innovations” do not cause “se-
rious disruption to the real economy.”9 
Naturally, the mismatch thesis, like other basic theories, comes in a wide variety 
of flavors sparkled with colorful debates. But its underlying principles are broadly 
accepted by both liberals and radicals, and few if any question their general validity.  
This intellectual complacency, we argue, is grossly misplaced. As we shall see 
later in the article, the thesis itself does not withstand scrutiny. But the problem be-
gins before we even get to the thesis: it starts with the very assumptions the argument 
is built on.  
 
The Basic Assumptions 
 
There are three key assumptions. The first is that nominal finance and “real” capital 
are two quantitative entities that can be measured. The second is that these two quan-
tities can be measured independently of each other – one in money units, the other in 
hedonic-productive units. And the third is that, under ideal circumstances, the two 
quantities should be equal, so that the magnitudes of nominal finance and “real” 
capital are the same.  
Unfortunately, none of these assumptions holds water. Stated briefly, the first 
problem is that, while finance has a definite quantity denominated in dollars and 
cents, “real” capital does not: its units – whatever they are – cannot be measured. 
Economists pretend to solve the impasse by using a proxy measure, but their solution 
creates a second problem. The proxy they use is not “real,” but nominal: instead of 
material units, it’s counted in dollars and cents! Finally, even this nominal expres-
sion of “real” capital doesn’t do the trick: it rarely equals the magnitude of finance 
and, moreover, it tends to oscillate in an opposite direction!  
These considerations lead to two distinct options, both unpalatable. If we accept 
that “real” capital doesn’t have a quantity, it follows that finance has nothing to 
match and therefore nothing to mismatch. And if we concur with the economists and 
use their nominal proxy, we end up with a pseudo “real” capital that rarely if ever 
matches the quantity of finance. In other words, we end up with a theory that is al-
most always wrong – a conclusion which in turn means either that capital suffers 
from a chronic split personality, or that the economists simply don’t know what they 
are talking about.  
                                                 
9 John Kay, “Why More Regulation Will Not Save Us from the Next Crisis,” Financial Times, 
March 26, 2008, p. 15; Vincent Boland, “Top Economists Press for Banking Regulation 
Shake-Up,” Financial Times, December 4, 2008 and “Economists Join Drive for Rethink on 
Regulation,” Financial Times, December 16, 2008, p. 25. 
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With this overview in mind, let us now turn to the details, beginning with the 
underlying separation between the “real” and the nominal.  
 
The Duality 
 
Modern economics, both mainstream and heterodox, starts from a basic duality. Ac-
cording to this view, first spelled out in the eighteenth century by philosopher David 
Hume, the economy consists of two distinct spheres: “real” and nominal. The impor-
tant sphere is the “real” one. For the liberals, this is the domain of scarcity, the 
sphere where demand and supply allocate limited resources between unlimited 
wants. For the Marxists, this is the bedrock of the class struggle, the arena where 
workers produce value and capitalists exploit them through the appropriation of sur-
plus value.  
Taken in its totality, the “real” economy is the site where production and con-
sumption take place, where sweat and tears are shed so that desires can be fulfilled, 
where factors of production mix with technology, where capitalists invest for profit 
and workers labor for wages, where conflict clashes with cooperation, where anony-
mous market forces meet the visible hand of power. It’s the raison d'être, the locus of 
action, the means and ends of economics. It is the real thing.  
The nominal economy merely reflects this reality. Unlike the “real” economy, 
with its productive efforts, tangible goods and useful services, the nominal sphere is 
entirely symbolic. Its various entities – fiat money, credit and debt, equities and secu-
rities – are all denominated in dollars and cents. They are counted partly in minted 
coins and printed notes, but mostly in electronic bits and bytes. This is a parallel uni-
verse, a world of mirrors and echoes. Whether accurate or inaccurate, it a mere image 
of the real thing.   
This duality of the “real” and the nominal pervades all of economics, including 
the concept of capital. Here, too, there are two types of capital: “real” capital, or 
wealth, and financial capital, or capitalization. “Real” capital is made of so-called 
capital goods. It comprises means of production – plant and equipment, infrastruc-
ture, work in progress and, according to many economists, also knowledge. Finan-
cial capital, by contrast, is the symbolic ownership claims on capital goods. It exists 
as nominal “capitalization” – namely, as the present value of the earnings that the 
capital goods are expected to generate.  
 
Irving Fisher’s House of Mirrors 
 
The duality of “real” and financial capital was articulated a century ago, by the 
American economist Irving Fisher. This was the beginning of a process that econo-
mists today like to call “financialization,” and Fisher was one of the first theorists to 
systematically articulate its logic. Table 1 summarizes his framework:    
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Table 1 
Fisher’s House of Mirrors 
 
 PRESENT CAPITAL  FUTURE INCOME 
QUANTITIES 
(“REAL”) capital wealth n J income services 
   L o 
VALUES 
(FINANCIAL) capital value  p  income value 
 
SOURCE: Adapted from Irving Fisher, The Rate of Interest (NY: The 
Macmillan Company, 1907), p. 14 
 
Let’s hear what Fisher has to say about this logic and then try to summarize 
it in simpler words:  
 
The statement that “capital produces income” is true only in the physical 
sense; it is not true in the value sense. That is to say, capital-value does not pro-
duce income-value. On the contrary, income-value produces capital-value. . . . 
[W]hen capital and income are measured in value, their causal connection is 
the reverse of that which holds true when they are measured in quantity. The 
orchard produces the apples; but the value of the apples produces the value 
of the orchard. . . . We see, then, that present capital-wealth produces future 
income-services, but future income-value produces present capital-value.10 
 
The three-step sequence in Table 1 goes as follows. In step 1, the stock of “real” 
capital goods, or what economists think of as “wealth,” generates future income ser-
vices. For example, in an Intel factory, the machines comprise the “real” capital 
wealth that exists here and now, while the microchips that these machines will (sup-
posedly) produce constitute the future income services.  
In step 2, the future income services become future income value. This conver-
sion will happen in the future, when Intel’s owners sell the microchips in return for 
dollars and cents. However, step 3 shows us that the owners of Intel don’t have to 
wait until the income services are produced and the income value is earned. They 
can easily capitalize, or “discount,” these flows, here and now. This capitalization 
closes the circle. It brings the future income flows to their “present value,” and by so 
doing helps the owners convert their physical capital wealth into a financial capital 
value.  
The end result is an equality. The “real” capital on the asset side of Intel’s bal-
ance sheet corresponds to the financial capital on its liabilities side. The quantity of 
                                                 
10 Irving Fisher, The Rate of Interest (NY: The Macmillan Company, 1907), pp. 13-14, original 
emphases. 
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Intel’s machines, structures, inventories and knowledge, taken in the aggregate, is 
equal to the total dollar value of its capitalized equity and debt obligations. The 
nominal “Idea” mirrors the real “Thing.” 
Nowadays, after a century of economic and financial indoctrination, the in-
formed reader may find this process fundamental, if not trivial. But in fact, it is nei-
ther fundamental nor trivial. If anything, it is fundamentally wrong.  Let’s see why. 
 
Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Who is the Prettiest of them All? 
 
The first question to ask is why do economists need two spheres to begin with – par-
ticularly when one sphere is simply a mirror image of the other? Why worry about 
the nominal Idea when one already knows the “real” Thing itself? Isn’t this duplica-
tion redundant, not to say irrational and wasteful?  
For most economists, the answer to the last question is a resounding yes: the 
nominal sphere is definitely redundant. Money may be useful as a “lubricant,” a way 
to lessen the friction of a barter economy. But that is just a sidekick. Analytically, 
money is no more than a duplicate. “There cannot, in short, be intrinsically a more 
insignificant thing, in the economy of society, than money,” declares nineteenth-
century economist John Stuart Mill.11 And that view hasn’t changed much since it 
was first pronounced: “Money is ‘neutral,’ a ‘veil’ with no consequences for real 
economic magnitudes,” reiterates twentieth-century Nobel Laureate Franco Modi-
gliani.12 These are not misquotes. Open any economics textbook and you’ll find al-
most all of it denominated and analyzed solely in “real” terms. In theory, the only 
thing that matters is the “real” economy. The nominal side is entirely redundant. 
But this theoretical posture is mostly for show. In practice, economists can do 
very little without the nominal world, and for a very simple reason. As it turns out, 
their so-called “real” economy cannot be measured directly. The only way to count 
its quantities is indirectly, by looking at the economy’s nominal mirror.  
And here there arises a tiny problem. If economists see the reality only through 
its reflections, how can they ever be sure that what they see is what they get?  
 
Fundamental Quantities 
 
As we have seen, economists begin with two parallel sets of quantities – “real” and 
nominal – and, in line with this duality, assume that the value of finance, measured 
as capitalization, is equal to the amount of wealth embedded in capital goods. But 
there is a clear pecking order here. The key is “real” capital. This is the productive 
                                                 
11 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy. With Some of Their Applications to Social 
Philosophy (New York: Co-operative Publication Society Mill: 1848. [1900]), Book 3, Ch. 7.  
12 Lucas Papademos and Franco Modigliani, “The Supply of Money and the Control of 
Nominal Income,” in Handbook of Monetary Economics, edited by B. Friedman and F. Hahn 
(New York: North Holland, 1990), p. 405.  
- 8 - 
 
 
 
 
 
BICHLER AND NITZAN 
 
source of the entire process. “Real” capital is what generates future income services, 
which, in turn, become future income value; and it is this future income value that 
gets discounted into the present value of nominal finance.  
In other words, the whole exercise is benchmarked against the material-
productive quantity of “real” capital. A mirror can only reflect that which already 
exists, and that requirement cannot be bypassed. In order to compute the quantity of 
nominal finance, we first need to know the quantity of “real” capital. And yet this 
prerequisite cannot be fulfilled. It turns out that the quantity of “real” capital is a pure 
fiction. Nobody has ever been able to measure it, and for the simplest of reasons: it 
doesn’t exist. 
Although economists like to mystify and obscure the issue, the gist of the prob-
lem is fairly easy to explain. Commodities are qualitatively different entities. Apples 
are different from microchips, just as automobile factories are different from oil rigs. 
These differences mean that we cannot compare and aggregate such entities in their 
own natural units. The solution to this diversity is to devise a “fundamental quan-
tity” common to all commodities, a basic measure that all commodities can be ex-
pressed in or reduced to.  
This method underlies the natural sciences. In physics, for example, the basic 
measurement units are mass, distance, time, electrical charge and heat. These are the 
fundamental quantities from which all other physical quantities derive: velocity is 
distance divided by time; acceleration is the rate of change of velocity; force is the 
product of mass and acceleration; etc. 
 
Utils and Abstract Labor 
 
Taking their cues from the physicists, economists have come up with their own fun-
damental quantities. The liberals, who like to emphasize the hedonic purpose of the 
economy, focus on the well-being that goods and services supposedly generate. This 
well-being, they argue, can be measured in “utils” – the universal unit of the liberal 
world. Unlike liberals, Marxists accentuate the grueling aspect of the economy – 
namely the process of production. This process, they claim, can be enumerated in 
terms of the socially necessary time it takes to produce a commodity, measured in 
universal units of “abstract labor.”  
In this way, every commodity – including the various artifacts of “real” capital –
can be measured in terms of a universal unit (with the particular choice depending on 
the economist’s theoretical preference). And once the reduction is achieved and the 
commodity quantified in util or abstract-labor terms, everything else falls into place. 
To illustrate, a liberal statistician might determine Intel’s productive capacity as 
equivalent to 1 trillion utils, to be generated over the life span of the company’s 
“real” capital; this flow of income services would then give rise to $50 billion of net 
income value; and, to close the circle, this income value, properly discounted to its 
present value, would be worth $200 billion in nominal market capitalization. Now, 
since the statistician is using fundamental quantities, she can easily compare different 
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companies. For instance, if ExxonMobil has 2 trillion utils’ worth of productive ca-
pacity – that is, twice as much as Intel’s – its market capitalization should also be 
twice that of Intel’s – i.e., $400 billion. 
A Marxist statistician would compute things a bit differently. Recall that “real” 
capital here is measured in terms not of the utils it generates but of the abstract labor 
time socially necessary to produce it. In our example, if the “real” capital of Exxon-
Mobil requires 10 million hours of socially necessary abstract labor to produce, while 
that of Intel takes only 2 million, their relative magnitudes is 5:1. And if the dollar 
capitalization of the two companies were to reflect this ratio, ExxonMobil would 
have a financial worth five times larger than Intel’s. 
This quantitative correspondence between financial and “real” capital is the 
foundation of the mismatch thesis. The liberal version of the thesis begins by assum-
ing that the two magnitudes should match – and then uses various distortions to jus-
tify their mismatch. The Marxists start from the other end. They assume that capital-
ism has a built-in tendency that drives these two magnitudes apart – and then use 
crisis to bring them back to a match.13  But both versions – whether they begin from 
a match or a mismatch – hinge on the quantity of “real” capital. This quantitative 
benchmark is the ultimate “reality” that financial capital supposedly matches or 
mismatches.  
The only problem is that this “reality” is really a fiction.   
 
Revelations 
 
The simple fact is that, unlike physicists, economists have never managed to identify, 
let alone calculate, their fundamental quantities. Whereas mass, distance, time, elec-
trical charge and heat are readily measurable, no liberal has ever been able to observe 
a util, and no Marxist has ever seen a unit of abstract labor.  
To their credit, the founders of the neoclassical faith – the all-dominant doctrine 
of “Economics” – were quite honest about their utilitarian racket. Stanley Jevons, for 
instance, admitted that “a unit of pleasure or pain is difficult to even conceive,” 
while Alfred Marshall noted that desires and wants, which he correlated with utility, 
“cannot be measured directly.” But the lure of the util proved too difficult to resist, 
and the neoclassicists went right on to build their entire quantitative dogma based on 
this “difficult-to-even-conceive” unit.14  
Marx treated his own fundamental quantity with much more respect. Unlike the 
neoclassicists, he truly believed that a unit of abstract labor could be measured – per-
                                                 
13 Marx’s view on the difference between financial and “real” capital and their tendency to 
converge through crisis is carefully examined in Michael Perelman, “The Phenomenology of 
Constant Capital and Fictitious Capital,” Review of Radical Political Economics, 1990, Vol. 22, 
Nos. 2-3, pp. 66-91. 
14 The quotes are from Stanley W. Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy, (Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1871), p. 11 and Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics. An 
Introductory Volume, 8th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1920), p. 78. 
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haps by equating it with a unit of unskilled labor. “A commodity,” he asserted, “may 
be the product of the most skilled labour, but its value, by equating it to the product 
of simple unskilled labour, represents a definite quantity of the latter labour alone.” 
Moreover, in his view, this benchmark unit could be readily observed in the Ameri-
can free market, where “the abstraction of the category ‘labor’, ‘labor in general’, 
labor sans phrase, the starting point of modern political economy, becomes realized in 
practice.”15  
The problem with these statements is that, even if we could somehow know 
what abstract labor looks like – a yet-to-be substantiated proposition – there is still no 
way to convert different forms of labor to units of abstract labor, however measured. 
And, indeed, in practice, neither Marx nor his followers have ever been able to calcu-
late the abstract labor equivalent of an hour of an English foreman, a U.S. electrical 
engineer, a Japanese brain surgeon or a South African truck driver.16 
 Needless to say, this inability to measure utils and abstract labor is a make-or-
break junction. If these indeed are invisible, not to say logically impossible, units, 
they cannot be used to measure the quantity of commodities – including the quantity 
of “real” capital. And if the magnitude of “real” capital is unknown if not unknow-
able, what then is left of the mismatch thesis? 
But not to worry. Religion is rarely gridlocked on technicalities, and economics 
is no exception. Everyone knows that the real God reveals himself through his mira-
cles, and, according to most economists, the same holds true for “real” capital: its 
quantity reveals itself through the price. Instead of trying to measure “real” capital in 
units of utils or abstract labor and then compare the result to the dollar value of that 
capital, the economists simply go in reverse. They first look at the dollar value of the 
capital goods and then assume that this dollar value reveals the “real” quantity of the 
underlying capital.17 
                                                 
15 The first quote is from Karl Marx, Capital. A Critique of Political Economy. Vol. 1: The Process of 
Capitalist Production. (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company, 1867 [1906]), p. 51. The second 
quote is from Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Chicago: Charles 
Kerr & Company, 1911), p. 299. 
16 The logical impossibility of this conversion is examined in Philip Harvey, “The Value-
Creating Capacity of Skilled Labor in Marxian Economics,” Review of Radical Political 
Economics, 1985, Vol. 17, No. 1-2, pp. 83-102. For a broad critique of Marx’s value theory, see 
Nitzan and Bichler, Capital as Power. A Study of Order and Creorder (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2009), Chs. 6-7. 
17 The actual computation, of course, is a bit more involved. In practice, the economists 
consider the quantity of “real” capital as equal not to its actual dollar value, but to its 
“constant” dollar value – i.e., to its aggregate nominal dollar value divided by its unit price. 
The problem is that in order to compute the price of a unit of “real” capital, we first need to 
know what that unit is. However, as we have seen, this unit – expressed in either utils or 
abstract labor – is unknowable, so the economists are forced to pretend. They convince 
themselves that they know what this unit is, assign it a price and then use this price to 
“deflate” the dollar value of capital goods. But, then, if one already knows how to measure 
capital directly in utils or abstract labor, what’s the point of the indirect calculations?  
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Thus, for a liberal, a 1:3 price ratio between two Toyota factories means that the 
latter has three times the util-generating quantity of the former. Similarly, for a Marx-
ist, this ratio is evidence that the abstract labor quantity of the second factory is three 
times that of the first.  
Unfortunately, this logic makes us go in a circle. Recall that the starting point of 
the mismatch thesis is an ideal equality between the money quantity of capitalization 
and the “real” quantity of capital. But now it turns out that the “real” quantity of 
capital – the entity that nominal finance supposedly equals to and unfortunately dis-
torts – is itself nothing but . . . money! So, in the end, there is no “real” benchmark – 
and yet, without such benchmark, what exactly is there to mismatch?  
 
Let’s be Pragmatic 
 
At this point, the mismatch theorists – i.e., the vast majority of economists – should 
have packed up and gone home. Of course, this departure never happened – nor is it 
likely to occur anytime soon. The economists, for all their mischief, remain in the 
sweet spot. Contrary to the textbook ideal, the market for economic ideology is nei-
ther perfectly competitive nor fully informed. The economists retain the exclusive 
right to produce and sell the “economic” omens. And as long as the laity fails to see 
that the sellers are partly naked and the ideological merchandise often rotten, the 
buyers continue to pay, the market continues to clear, and the racketeers continues to 
prosper. 
So let’s remain seated and see where the economic plot takes us. Our new start-
ing point now is that “money is real,” so that the dollar value of capital goods repre-
sents their quantity as “real” capital (with inverted commas, given the unreal nature 
of this “reality”). This correspondence supposedly applies at every level of analysis, 
from the single firm all the way to the global arena. “I find it useful,” says the know-
all Alan Greenspan, “to think of the world economy’s equity capital in the context of 
the global consolidated balance sheet. . . . with physical assets at market value on the 
left-hand side of the balance sheet and the market value of equity on the right-hand 
side. Changes in equity values result in equal changes on both sides of the balance 
sheet.”18 
Now, this new setup, although logically faulty, if not circular, has one important 
advantage: it enables a “pragmatic” test. The nominal proxy for “real” capital now is 
fully observable and therefore readily comparable to the corresponding magnitude of 
financial capitalization. All we have to do is measure and see. The economic scrip-
tures, summarized in Table 1 above, tell us that the two magnitudes should be mirror 
images of each other. But the facts say otherwise.  
  
                                                 
18 Alan Greenspan, “Equities Show Us the Way to Recovery,” Financial Times, March 30, 
2009, p. 9.  
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Microsoft versus General Motors 
 
Figure 1 compares the so-called “real” and financial sides of two leading U.S. firms – 
Microsoft and General Motors (GM). Keeping with our vow, we go along with the 
economists and assume here that the productive capacity of each company – namely, 
its “real” capital – can be measured by the dollar value of its capital goods.  
There are four sets of bars in the chart, each presenting a different type of facts 
about the two companies. The grey bars are for GM, the black ones for Microsoft. On 
top of each of the Microsoft bars, we denote the percent ratio of Microsoft relative to 
GM.  
The two sets of bars on the left present data on the “material” operations of the 
two firms. In terms of relative employment, depicted by the first set, GM is a giant and 
Microsoft is a dwarf. In 2005, GM had 335,000 workers, 5.5 times more than Micro-
soft’s 61,000. The second set of bars denotes the respective dollar value of the compa-
nies’ plant and equipment, measured in historical cost (i.e. the original purchase price). 
0
100
200
300
400
500
Employees (000) Plant and
Equipment ($bn)
Market Value
($bn)
Market Value and
Debt ($bn)
GM
Microsoft
18%
3%
64%
www.bnarchives.net
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Figure 1 
General Motors versus Microsoft, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The per cent figures indicate, for any given measure, the size of 
Microsoft relative to GM. 
 
SOURCE: Compustat through WRDS (series codes: data29 for 
employees; data8 for net plant and equipment; data24 for price; data54 
for common shares outstanding; data181 for total liabilities). 
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In line with our concession, we assume that these dollar values are proportionate to the 
“productive capacity,” or the “real” capital of the two companies. According to these 
statistics, in 2005 the “real” capital of GM, standing at $78 billion, was 33 times larger 
than Microsoft’s, whose capital goods were worth a mere $2.3 billion. 
The two sets of bars on the right show the companies’ respective capitalization – 
that is, the magnitude of their nominal finance. Here the picture is exactly the opposite, 
with Microsoft being the giant and GM the dwarf. In 2005, Microsoft’s equity had a 
market value of $283 billion, nearly 26 times GM’s $11 billion. And even if we take the 
sum of debt and market value (which supposedly stands as the total claim on a com-
pany’s “real” capital), the GM total of $475 billion was only 55% greater than Micro-
soft’s $306 billion – a far cry from its relatively huge workforce and massive plant and 
equipment.   
The usual response to such a discrepancy, from Alfred Marshall onward, points to 
“technology” and “human capital.” This is the “knowledge economy,” the experts tell 
us. Obviously, Microsoft’s disproportionate market value must be due to its superior 
know-how, packed as “immaterial” or “intangible” assets. And since intangibles are 
not included in the fixed assets of corporate balance sheets on the one hand yet bear on 
market capitalization on the other, we end up with a market value that deviates, often 
considerably, from the tangible stock of “real” capital.  
This is a popular academic claim, and for good reason: it is entirely reversible and 
totally irrefutable. To illustrate, simply consider the reverse assertion – namely that 
GM has more know-how than Microsoft. Since nobody knows how to quantify tech-
nology, how can we decide which of the two claims is correct? 
 
Tobin’s Q 
 
The discrepancy between capitalization and “real” capital is by no means limited to 
individual firms or particular time periods. In fact, it appears to be the rule rather than 
the exception.  
Figure 2 broadens the picture. Instead of examining two firms at a point in time, it 
looks at all U.S. corporations over time. The chart plots two lines. The thick line is our 
revised “real” benchmark, counted in dollar terms. It shows the current, or replace-
ment cost of corporate fixed assets (comprising plant and equipment). This measure 
tells us, for each year, how much it would have cost to produce the existing plant and 
equipment at prices that prevailed during the year. The thin line is the corresponding 
magnitude of finance. It measures the total capitalization of corporate equities and 
bonds that presumably mirrors the quantity of these fixed assets. Note that we plot the 
two series against a logarithmic scale, and that often the difference between them is 
very large – having recently reached many trillions of dollars.19  
                                                 
19 A logarithmic scale amplifies the variations of a series when its values are small and 
compresses these variations when the values are large. This property makes it easier to 
visualize exponential growth (note that the numbers on the scale jump by multiples of 10).  
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Figure 2 
The “Quantity” of U.S. Capital 
www.bnarchives.net
 
NOTE: The market value of equities and bonds is net of foreign 
holdings by U.S. residents. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global In-
sight (series codes: FAPNREZ for current cost of corporate fixed 
assets). The market value of corporate equities & bonds splices se-
ries from the following two sources. 1932-1951: Global Financial 
Data (market value of corporate stocks and market value of bonds 
on the NYSE). 1952-2007: Federal Reserve Board through Global 
Insight (series codes: FL893064105 for market value of corporate 
equities; FL263164003 for market value of foreign equities held by 
U.S. residents; FL893163005 for market value of corporate and for-
eign bonds; FL263163003 for market value of foreign bonds held by 
U.S. residents). 
 
Figure 3 calibrates these differences. The chart plots the so-called Tobin’s Q ratio 
for the U.S. corporate sector from 1932 to 2008 (with the last year being an estimate).20 
                                                 
20 The Q-ratio was proposed by James Tobin and William Brainard as part of their analysis of 
government stabilization and growth policies. See their articles “Pitfalls in Financial Model 
Building,” American Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings, 1968, Vol. 58, No. 2, May, pp. 99-
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In this figure, Tobin’s Q measures the ratio between corporate capitalization and capital 
goods: for each year, the series takes the market value of all outstanding corporate 
stocks and bonds and divides it by the current replacement cost of corporate fixed as-
sets. Since both magnitudes are denominated in current prices, the ratio between them 
is a pure number.  
Figure 3 
Tobin’s Q in the United States 
www.bnarchives.net
 
NOTE: The market value of equities and bonds is net of foreign 
holdings by U.S. residents. The 2008 estimate is based on extrapolat-
ing the underlying series. The last data point for the market value of 
corporate equities and bonds is for 2008:Q3. The extrapolation as-
sumes that during 2008:Q4 the market value of equities dropped by 
20% and that the value of bonds remained unchanged. The last data 
point for the current cost of corporate fixed assets is for 2007. The 
extrapolation assumes that in 2008 this cost rose by 6% – an increase 
equivalent to the average growth of the previous ten years. 
 
SOURCE: See Figure 2. 
                                                                                                                         
122; and “Asset Markets and the Cost of Capital,” in Economic Progress, Private Values, and 
Public Policy: Essays in the Honor of William Fellner, edited by B. Balassa and R. Nelson 
(Amsterdam and New York: North-Holland Publishing Co. 1977), pp. 235-262.     
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Here too we uphold our theoretical concession. We assume that Fisher’s symme-
try between “real” assets and dollar capitalization, although failing the materialistic 
test, can still hold in nominal space. Now, if this assumption were true to the letter, 
Tobin’s Q should have been 1. One dollar’s worth of “real” assets would create a defi-
nite future flow of money income, and that flow, once discounted, would in turn gen-
erate one dollar’s worth of market capitalization. The facts, though, seem to suggest 
otherwise.  
There are two clear anomalies. First, the historical mean value of the series is not 
1, but 1.3. Second, the actual value of Tobin’s Q fluctuates heavily – over the past 77 
years it has oscillated between a low of 0.6 and a high of 2.8. Moreover, the fluctua-
tions do not look random in the least; on the contrary, they seem fairly stylized, mov-
ing in a wave-like fashion. Let’s inspect these anomalies in turn. 
 
The Curse of Intangibles 
 
Why is the long-term average of Tobin’s Q higher than 1? The conventional answer 
points to mismeasurment. To reiterate, fixed assets consist of plant and equipment; yet, 
as we have already seen in the case of Microsoft vs. GM, capitalization supposedly 
represents the entire productive capacity of the corporation – in other words, more than 
just its physical plant and equipment. And since Tobin’s Q measures the ratio between 
the whole and only one of its parts, plain arithmetic tells us the result must be bigger 
than 1. But, then, how much bigger? Even if we accept that there is mismeasurement 
here, the question remains as to why Tobin’s Q should average 1.3, rather than 1.01 or 
20 for instance. And here, too, just like in the case of Microsoft vs. GM, the answer is 
elusive.  
To pin down the difficulty, let’s examine the structure of a balance sheet a bit more 
closely. Economists and accountants tell us that corporations have two types of assets: 
tangible and intangible.21 According to their standard system of classification, tangible 
assets consist of capital goods – machines, structures and recently also software. Intan-
gible assets, by contrast, represent firm-specific knowledge, proprietary technology, 
goodwill and other metaphysical entities. Most economists (with the exception of some 
Marxists) consider both types of assets productive, and the accountants concur – but 
with a reservation. Although both tangible and intangible assets are deemed “real,” 
they cannot always be treated in the same way.  
The reason is prosaic. Tangible assets are bought and sold on the market and 
therefore have a universal price. Since the market is assumed to know all, this price is 
treated as an objective quantity and hence qualifies for inclusion in the balance sheet. 
                                                 
21 For mainstream analyses of intangibles, see for example, Baruch Lev, Intangibles. 
Management, Measurement, and Reporting (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
2001); and Carol Corrado, Charles Hulten and Daniel Sichel, “Intangible Capital and 
Economic Growth,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Federal Reserve Board, 
Division of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Washington DC, 2006. 
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By contrast, most intangible assets are produced by the firm itself. They are generated 
through internal R&D spending, in-house advertisement expenditures and sundry 
other costs associated with the likes of “corporate re-engineering” and “structural re-
organization.” These are not arm’s-length transactions. They are not subject to the uni-
versalizing discipline of the market, and therefore the intangible assets they generate 
lack an “objective” price. And items that do not have an agreed-upon price, no matter 
how productive, cannot make it into the balance sheet. The best the accountants can 
do is list them as current expenditures on the income statement.    
There are two exceptions to the rule, though. One exception is when companies 
purchase pre-packaged intangibles directly through the market – for instance, by ac-
quiring a franchise, patent, trademark, or copyright. The other is when one corporation 
acquires another at a price that exceeds the acquired company’s book value. Since the 
merger itself does not create new tangible assets, the accountants assume that the pre-
mium must represent the intangible assets of the new formation. They also assume that 
since this premium is determined by the market, it must be objective. And given that 
the intangibles here are objectively measured, the accountants feel safe enough to in-
clude them in the balance sheet.  
So all in all we have three categories of “real” capital: (1) tangible assets that are 
included in the balance sheet; (2) intangible assets that are included in the balance 
sheet; and (3) intangible assets that are not included in the balance sheet. Now, as 
noted, fixed assets comprise only the first category, whereas capitalization reflects the 
sum of all three; and, according to the conventional creed, it is this disparity that ex-
plains why the long-term average of Tobin’s Q differs from 1.  
 
A Measure of Our Ignorance 
 
The historical rationale goes as follows. Over the past several decades, U.S.-based cor-
porations have undergone an “intangible revolution.” Their economy has become 
“high-tech,” with knowledge, information and communication all multiplying mani-
fold. As a consequence of this revolution, the growth of tangible assets has decelerated, 
while that of intangible assets has accelerated.  
And how do we know the extent of this divergence? Simple, say the neoclassicists. 
Just use the “Quantity Revelation Theorem.” According to this theorem, the market 
knows all, and, if we read it correctly, its capitalization will tell us the true total quan-
tity of capital. Now, it is true that this revelation takes place only under ideal condi-
tions – i.e. when markets are perfectly competitive, when there are no economies of 
scale and when capitalists are powerless – but since nobody is likely to protest, we can 
just go ahead and assume that all of these conditions apply. With this assumption, the 
only thing left to do now is subtract from the market value of firms the market price of 
their fixed assets – and then call the difference the “quantity of intangibles.”22 
                                                 
22 The “Quantity Revelation Theorem” is articulated in Martin Neil Bailey, “Productivity and 
the Services of Capital and Labor,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1981, No. 1, pp. 1-50. 
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Applying this true-by-definition logic, a 2006 study of the S&P 500 companies es-
timates that, over the previous thirty years, the ratio between their market value and 
the book value of their tangible assets has risen more than fourfold: from 1.2 in 1975 to 
5 in 2005.23 The increase implies that in 1975 intangibles amounted to 17% of the total 
assets, whereas in 2005 they accounted for as much as 80%. Much of this increase is 
attributed to the growth of out-of-balance-sheet intangibles, whose share of market 
capitalization during the period is estimated to have risen from 15 to 65%. 
Conclusion: the 1.3 mean value of Tobin’s Q is hardly a mystery. It is simply an-
other “measure of our ignorance” – in this case, our inability to measure intangibles 
directly. Fortunately, the problem can be circumvented easily by indirect imputation. 
And, indeed, looking at Figure 3, we can see that much of the increase in Tobin’s Q 
occurred over the past couple of decades – coinciding, as one would expect, with the 
upswing of the “intangible revolution.”  
This rationale may sound soothing to neoclassical ears, but accepting it must come 
with some unease. To begin with, the neoclassicists don’t really “measure” intangibles; 
rather, they deduce them, like the ether, as a residual. This deduction – whereby intan-
gibles, like God’s miracles, are proven by our very inability to explain them – already 
gives the whole enterprise the mystical aura of an organized religion. And there is 
more. According to the neoclassicists’ own imputations, the residual accounted, at 
least until very recently, for as much as 80% of total market value. To accept this mag-
nitude as a fact is to concede that the “measurable” basis of the theory, shaky as it is, 
accounts for no more than 20% of market capitalization – hardly an impressive 
achievement for a theory that calls itself scientific. Finally, the imputed results seem 
excessively volatile, to put it politely. Given that the quantity of intangibles is equal to 
the difference between market value and tangible assets, oscillations in market value 
imply corresponding variations in intangible assets. But, then, why would the quantity 
of a productive asset, no matter how intangible, fluctuate – and often wildly – even 
from one day to the next? And how could the variations be so large? Should we be-
lieve, based on the recent global collapse of market capitalization, that the corporate 
sector has just seen more than half of its intangible productive capacity evaporate into 
thin air?  
 
Irrationality 
 
The solution to these riddles is to invoke irrationality. In this augmented neoclassical 
version, capitalized market value consists of not two components, but three: in addi-
tion to tangible and intangible assets, it also includes an amount reflecting the excessive 
                                                                                                                         
A no-questions-asked application of this theorem is given in Robert E. Hall, “The Stock 
Market and Capital Accumulation,” The American Economic Review, 2001, Vol. 91, No. 5, 
December, pp. 1185-1202. 
23 Keith Cardoza, Justin Basara, Liddy Cooper and Rick Conroy, “The Power of Intangible 
Assets: An Analysis of the S&P 500,” Chicago, Illinois: Ocean Tomo, Intellectual Capital 
Equity, 2006. 
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optimism or pessimism of investors. And this last component, goes the argument, 
serves to explain the second anomaly of Tobin’s Q – namely its large historical fluctua-
tions.  
This irrationality rationale is illustrated in Figure 4. To explain it, let’s backtrack 
and refresh the basics of rational economics. During good times, goes the argument, 
capitalist optimism causes investors to plough back more profits into “real,” productive 
assets. During bad times, the process goes in reverse, with less profit earmarked for that 
purpose. As a result, the growth of “real” assets tends to accelerate in an upswing and 
decelerate in a downswing.  
 
Figure 4 
The World According to the Scriptures 
www.bnarchives.net
(annual % change)
(annual % change)
 
* Computed annually by adding to the historical average of the 
growth rate of current corporate fixed assets 2.5 times the deviation 
of the annual growth rate from its historical average. 
 
NOTE: Series are smoothed as 10-year moving averages. The last 
data points are for 2007. 
 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global In-
sight (series codes: FAPNREZ for current cost of corporate fixed 
assets). 
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This standard pattern is illustrated by the thick line in the figure. The line measures 
the rate of change of the current cost of corporate fixed assets (the denominator of 
Tobin’s Q), with the data smoothed as a 10-year moving average in order to accentuate 
its long term pattern. According to the figure, the U.S. corporate sector has gone 
through two very long “real” accumulation cycles (measured in current prices) – the 
first peaking in the early 1950s, the second in the early 1980s. 
The vigilant reader will note that the accumulation process here reflects only the 
tangible assets – for the obvious reason that the intangible ones cannot be observed 
directly. But this deficiency shouldn’t be much of a concern. Since neoclassical (and 
most Marxist) economists view intangible and tangible assets as serving the same pro-
ductive purpose, they can assume (although not prove) that their respective growth 
patterns, particularly over long periods of time, are more or less similar.24 So all in all, 
we could take the thick line as representing the overall accumulation rate of “real” capi-
tal, both tangible and intangible (denominated in current dollars to bypass the impossi-
bility of material quantities, measured in utils or abstract labor). 
Now this is where irrationality kicks in. In an ideal neoclassical world – perfectly 
competitive, completely transparent and fully informed – Fisher’s “capital value” and 
“capital wealth” would be the same. Capitalization on the stock and bond markets 
would exactly equal the dollar value of “real” tangible and intangible assets. The two 
sums would grow and contract together, moving up and down as perfect replicas. But 
even the neoclassicists realize that this is a mere ideal.  
Ever since Newton, we know that pure ideas may be good for predicting the 
movement of heavenly bodies, but not the folly of men. Newton learned this lesson the 
hard way after losing plenty of money in the bursting of the “South Sea Bubble.” Two 
centuries later, he was joined by no other than Irving Fisher, who managed to sacrifice 
his own fortune – $10 million then, $100 million in today’s prices – on the altar of the 
1929 stock market crash. 
So just to be on the safe side, neoclassicists now agree that, although capitalization 
does reflect the objective processes of the so-called “real” economy, the picture must be 
augmented by human beings. And the latter, sadly but truly, are not always rational. 
Greed and fear cloud their vision, emotions upset their calculations and passion biases 
their decisions – distortions that are further amplified by government intervention and 
regulation, lack of transparency, insider trading and other such unfortunate imperfec-
tions. All of these deviations from the pure model lead to irrationality, and irrationality 
causes assets to be mispriced.  
 
                                                 
24 If, as is now fashionable to believe, the trend growth rate of intangibles is faster than that of 
tangibles, then the overall growth rate of so-called “real” assets (tangible and intangible) would 
gradually rise above the growth rate of tangible assets only illustrated in Figure 4. However, 
since the cyclical pattern would be more or less the same, this possibility has no bearing on our 
argument.       
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The Boundaries of Irrationality 
 
But not all is lost. Convention has it that there is nonetheless order in the chaos, a cer-
tain rationality in the irrationality. The basic reason is that greed tends to operate 
mostly on the upswing, whereas fear usually sets in on the downswing. “We tend to 
label such behavioral responses as non rational,” explains the ever-quotable Alan 
Greenspan, “But forecasters’ concerns should be not whether human response is ra-
tional or irrational, only that it is observable and systematic.”25 Regularity puts limits 
on irrationality; limits imply predictability; and predictability helps keep the faith intact 
and the laity in place.    
The boundaries of irrationality are well known and can be recited even by novice 
traders. The description usually goes as follows. In the upswing, the growth of invest-
ment in productive assets fires up the greedy imagination of investors, causing them to 
price financial assets even higher. To illustrate, during the 1990s developments in 
“high-tech” hardware and software supposedly made investors lose sight of the possi-
ble. The evidence: they capitalized information and telecommunication companies, 
such as Amazon, Ericsson and Nortel, far above the underlying increase in their so-
called “real” value. A similar scenario unfolded in the 2000s. Investors pushed real-
estate capitalization, along with its various financial derivatives and structured invest-
ment vehicles, to levels that far exceeded the underlying “actual” wealth.  
This process – which neoclassicists like to think of as a “market aberration” – leads 
to undue “asset-price inflation.” The capitalization created by such “bouts of insanity,” 
says Eric Janszen, is mostly “fake wealth.” It represents “fictitious value” and leads to 
inevitable “bubbles.”26 But there is nonetheless a clear positive relationship here. “Bub-
bles,” says George Soros, “have two components: a trend that prevails in reality and a 
misconception relating to that trend.”27 And the relationship is straightforward: the 
irrational growth of “fake wealth,” although excessive, moves in the same direction as 
the rational growth of “real wealth.” 
The process is inverted during a bust. This is where fear kicks in. The so-called 
“real” economy decelerates, but investors, feeling as if the sky is falling, bid down asset 
prices far more than implied by the “underlying” productive capacity. An extreme il-
lustration is offered by the Great Depression. During the four years from 1928 to 1932, 
the dollar value of corporate fixed assets contracted by 20%, while the market value of 
equities collapsed by an amplified 70% (we have no aggregate figures for bonds). A 
similar undershooting is supposedly occurring right now: market values have fallen by 
one half or more, while the replacement cost of the so-called “real” capital stock has 
merely decelerated or perhaps declined slightly. Yet here, too, the relationship is clear: 
                                                 
25 Alan Greenspan, “We Will Never Have a Perfect Model of Risk,” Financial Times, March 
17, 2008, p. 9. 
26 Eric Janszen, “The Next Bubble. Priming the Markets for Tomorrow's Big Crash,” Harper's 
Magazine, February 2008, pp. 39-45. 
27 George Soros, “The Crisis & What to Do About It,” The New York Review of Books, 2008, 
Vol. 55, No. 19, December 4. 
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the irrational collapse of “fictitious value,” however exaggerated, moves together with 
the rational deceleration of “productive wealth.”  
This bounded irrationality is illustrated by the thin line in Figure 4. Note that this 
series is a hypothetical construct. It describes what the growth of capitalization might 
look like when neoclassical orthodoxy gets “distorted” by irrationality and market ab-
errations. The value for each year in the hypothetical series is computed in two steps. 
First, we calculate the deviation of the growth rate of the (smoothed) “real” series from 
its historical mean (so if the smoothed growth rate during the year is 8% and the his-
torical mean rate is 6.7%, the deviation is 1.3%). Second, we add 2.5 times the value of 
the deviation to the historical mean (so in our example, the hypothetical smoothed 
growth rate would be 2.5¯1.3 + 6.7 = 9.95%). The coefficient of 2.5 is purely arbitrary. 
A larger or smaller coefficient would generate a larger or smaller amplification, but the 
cyclical pattern would remain the same. 
This simulation solves the riddle of the fluctuating Tobin’s Q. It shows how, due to 
market imperfections and investors’ irrationality, the growth of capitalization over-
shoots “real” accumulation on the upswing, therefore causing Tobin’s Q to rise, and 
undershoots it on the downswing, causing Tobin’s Q to decline.  
And so everything falls into place. Tobin’s Q averages more than 1 due to an invisi-
ble, yet very real intangible revolution. And it fluctuates heavily – admittedly because 
the market is imperfect and humans are not always rational – but these oscillations are 
safely bounded and pretty predicable. The dollar value of capitalization indeed deviates 
from the “real” assets, but both the image and the “fundamentals” it reflects move in 
the same direction.  
Or do they?  
 
The Gods Must Be Crazy 
 
It turns out that while the priests of economics were busy fortifying the faith, the gods 
were having fun with the facts. The result is illustrated in Figure 5 (where both series 
again are smoothed as 10-year moving averages). The thick line, as in Figure 4, shows 
the rate of change of corporate fixed assets measured in current replacement cost. But 
the thin line is different. Whereas in Figure 4 this line shows the rate of growth of capi-
talization stipulated by the theory, here it shows the actual rate of growth as it unfolded 
on the stock and bond markets. And the difference couldn’t have been starker: the gy-
rations of capitalization, instead of amplifying those of “real” assets, move in exactly 
the opposite direction.  
It is important to note that our concern here is not with short-term interactions. 
Market buffs love to believe that forward-looking investors are able to “anticipate” the 
“real” economy – and in so doing make the fluctuations of finance look as if they 
“lead” the business cycle. This belief, whether true or not, is irrelevant to Figure 5. In 
this chart, the lag between the two cycles is measured not in months, but in decades – 
enough to bankrupt even the shrewdest of contrarians. Furthermore, this long-wave 
pattern seems anything but accidental. In fact, it is rather systematic: whenever the 
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growth rate of “real” assets decelerates, the growth rate of capitalization accelerates, 
and vice versa.28  
 
Figure 5 
U.S. Capital Accumulation: Fiction vs. Reality 
www.bnarchives.net
(annual % change)
(annual % change)
 
NOTE: The market value of equities and bonds are net of foreign 
holdings by U.S. residents. Series are shown as 10-year moving av-
erages. The last data points are 2008:Q3 for the market value of 
corporate equities and bonds, and 2007 for the current cost of cor-
porate fixed assets. 
 
SOURCE: See Figure 2. 
 
This reality puts the world on its head. One could perhaps concede that “real” as-
sets do not have a material quantum – yet pretend, as we have agreed to do here, that 
somehow this nonexistent quantum is proportionate to its dollar price. One could fur-
                                                 
28 Given our rejection of “material” measures of capital, there is no theoretical value in 
comparing the growth of the two series when measured in so-called “real” terms. But just to 
defuse the skepticism, we deflated the two series by the implicit price deflator of gross 
investment and calculated their respective “real” rates of change. The result is similar to 
Figure 5: the two growth rates move in opposite directions. 
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ther accept that the dollar value of “real” assets is misleading insofar as it excludes the 
“dark matter” of intangible assets (up to 80% of the total) – yet nonetheless be con-
vinced that these invisible intangibles are miraculously “revealed” by the know-all 
market. Finally, one could allow economic agents to be irrational – yet assume that 
their irrational pricing of assets ends up oscillating around the rational “fundamentals” 
(whatever they may be). But it seems a bit too much to follow Fisher and claim that the 
long-term growth rate of capitalization is driven by the accumulation of “real” assets 
whe
s and 1990s – the capitalists 
wer hing all the way to the stock and bond markets.  
he Crash of the Mismatch Thesis 
al goods – since this value, 
wha
us of reasons: misleading explanations 
help
d marginalize any attempt to understand the power un-
derpinnings of accumulation.  
n the two processes in fact move in opposite directions.  
And, yet, that is precisely what neoclassicists (and most Marxists) seem to argue. 
Both emphasize the growth of “real” assets as the fountain of riches – while the facts 
say the very opposite. According to Figure 5, during the 1940s and 1970s, when the 
dollar value of “real” assets expanded the fastest, capitalists saw their capitalization 
growth dwindling. And when the value of “real” assets decelerated – as they had dur-
ing the 1950s and early 1960s, and, again, during the 1980
e laug
 
T
 
Given these considerations, it is hardly surprising that few economists predicted the 
current crisis – and that, of those who did, none rested their case on evidence of a fi-
nance/“reality” mismatch. There was simply no evidence to use. There was no way of 
knowing the “real” quantity of capital before the crisis started, and therefore no way of 
knowing whether or not this quantity was distorted by finance. And there was also no 
point in hanging one’s hopes on the nominal value of capit
tever its stands for, is always distorted by finance.  
With this dismal record, why do capitalists continue to employ economists and 
subsidize their university departments? Shouldn’t they fire them all, demand that their 
Nobel Laureates be stripped of their prizes and close the tap of academic money? The 
answer is not in the least, and for the most obvio
 divert attention from what really matters.  
The economists would have the laity believe that the “real thing” is the tangible 
quantities of production, consumption, knowledge and the capital stock, and that the 
nominal world merely reflects this “reality” with unfortunate distortions. This view 
may appeal to workers, but it has nothing to do with the reality of accumulation. For 
the capitalists, the only real thing is nominal capitalization, and what lies behind this 
capitalization is not the production cost or productivity of capital goods, but the fist of 
capitalist power. To study this power is to study the logic of the capitalist order, and it 
is here that the economists come in handy. By emphasizing production and consump-
tion, they help avert, divert an
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But the times, they are a-chaingin’. The current crisis has caused the economists’ 
stature to diminish somewhat, and with the smokescreen dissipating, if only briefly, the 
power basis of capital comes into view.    
For more on that issue, stay tuned for the next installment in our series. 
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